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Philosophical Influences in Developmental Psychology: 
Vygotsky, Piaget and the Question of Normativity 
JAN DERRY 
Institute of Education, University of London 
Recent work in psychology has given particular attention to normativity arguing that 
developmental psychology ignores the role of norms in human cognition to its cost 
(Smith and Voneche, 2006). Traditional empiricism has been unable to do justice to 
the normativity of concept use and to its role in human awareness (McDowell, 1994; 
Brandom, 1996, 2000). But now development psychologists are to give normativity 
due recognition (Smith and Voneche, 2006). 
In this paper I will use Donaldson's and Hughes' reproduction of the classic 
experiment (the three mountain task) designed by Piaget and Inhelder, in tandem with 
a particular reading of Piaget, to bring to light the distinctive philosophical 
underpinnings of Vygotsky's work and their relation to contemporary work on 
normativity. I will suggest that findings resulting from Donaldson's and Hughes' 
'hide and seek' task, when interpreted in relation to normativity, have significant 
implications for education. 
While comparisons between Vygotsky and Piaget are frequently made from the 
point of view of psychology, here attention is directed to the less well aired but no 
less important, philosophic differences between them. This paper will put these 
differences in context with reference to ideas of Spinoza and Hegel relevant to 
Vygotsky's conception of mind and world and its differences from that of Piaget. 
Both thinkers were fully aware of the philosophical context of their work. Brockmeier, 
who has pointed out how 'Piaget never lost sight of the philosophical dimension of 
psychology', comments on Piaget's retreat from the metaphysical issues of his youth 
(Bergsonian) and ' ... the emergence ... of the omnipresence of reference to Kant 
(Brockmeier, 1996, p. 125). Bronkart explains that for Piaget 'the main issue .. .is 
nothing other than the construction of the categories of understanding in The Critique 
of Pure Reason' (Bronckart, 1996, pp. 92-93). Similarly, Vygotsky's debt to Hegel 
and Spinoza is fully recognised (Van der Veer and Val siner, 1993, Kozulin, 1990). 
Crediting Spinoza, Vygotsky remarks; 'My intellect has been shaped under the sign of 
Spinoza's words' (Vygotsky, 1925/1971). 
The argument here is that certain characteristics of the Piaget's three mountains 
task can be understood as a reflection of a presumed Kantian framework which 
contains the following elements: opposition as distinct and separate; the separation of 
different processes from one another and the supposition of an individual, mentalist 
model of development. This argument involves a particular reading of both Kant and 
Piaget, focussed on the early Piaget. The purpose is not to deny the existence of 
reference to norms in Piaget's work but it is a specific stance on the nature of 
normativity that is of interest here. The complexity of the nature of normativity is 
recognised and is still being worked out. The area covered by the topic is broad with 
work on normativity ranging from enquiries into moral norms, at a macro level 
(Korsgaard, 1996), to considerations of the distinctive nature of human awareness and 
© 2009 The Author 
28 JANDERRY 
of responsiveness to reasons, at a micro level (Brandom, 2000). My concern here is 
not moral norms but norms in play at the level of awareness. 
Attention to the role of normativity at the level of awareness has been given 
prominence in recent years by Brandom' s work. Brandom argues that humans stand 
apart from animals and machines in that they respond to reasons as well as to causes. 
He claims the representationalist paradigm, that is that awareness is understood in 
representational terms, has reigned supreme since Descartes. Countering this 
paradigm, he argues that to understand ourselves as knowers we need to reverse the 
conventional order of explanation which prioritises representation over inference. We 
should instead understand conceptual awareness in inferential terms i.e. in terms of 
the network of inferential relations (what is a reason for what) that constitute concepts 
in the first place. Brandom credits Hegel for inspiring his proj ect. Both locate 
conscious awareness in social practices thus allowing for an account of the origin of 
cognition in sociogenesis. 
Both Piaget and Vygotsky held to a form of genetic epistemology. Piaget, of 
course was responsible for establishing the phrase and for arguing that the study of 
psychogenesis should be an indispensable part of epistemological analysis. 
Epistemological analysis from the perspective of genetic epistemology concentrates 
on the practical aspects of concept formation rather than on conceptual analysis. But 
Vygotsky placed social interaction at the centre on his work and his emphasis on 
sociogenesis contrasted with Piaget's structuralist approach which viewed cognition 
as arising from the interaction between individual and environment. For Piaget the 
Kantian idea of receptivity is pivotal, receptivity being the idea that at one level a 
form of knowing arises merely by the mind interacting with the world. For Vygotsky 
who rejected the stark dualism of mind and world, all knowing (concept acquisition), 
occurs in a context/frame (the space of reasons) which is part of the world that 
humans inhabit, a world made significant by human activities. This includes both 
learning at the level of what Kant has called receptivity and at a deeper level where a 
more conscious construction takes place. 
The question of how a child develops their cognitive faculties was of central 
interest to both psychologists. For Piaget the child operates according to her own 
logic in contrast to that of the adult. Piaget's experiments demonstrate stark 
differences in the mode of thought of pre-school children and Piaget discerns clear 
stages in their development. Of particular interest to Vygotsky was Piaget's account 
of children's egocentrism, a lack of ability to distinguish a perspective different from 
their own. (Piaget (1962) describes cognitive egocentrism as 'unconscious 
preferential focusing, or lack of differentiation of viewpoints'). Vygotsky discussed 
this aspect of Piaget's work and criticised him on a number of points but most 
specifically on his failure to recognise that 'the empirical laws and regularities [he] 
established in connection with the child's logic apply only within the domain of the 
child's unsystematised thought. They apply only to concepts taken outside of any 
system' (Vygotsky, 1987, p. 192). For Vygotsky the systemic nature of concepts play 
a significant role in the development of thought. It is the systemic nature of what he 
termed 'scientific' or academic concepts that led Vygotsky to place importance on 
instruction as leading development in contrast to the importance placed on activity by 
Piaget. 
Vygotsky also took issue with the way that 'Piaget represents the child's mental 
development as a process where the characteristics of the child's thought die out' and 
he went on to explain that for Piaget: 
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The developmental process is not represented as the continual emergence of new 
characteristics of thought of higher, more complex and more developed forms of 
thought on the foundations of more elementary and primary forms of thought. 
Rather development is portrayed as a process through which one form of thought 
is gradually and continually being forced out by another (p. 175). 
And he continued: 
What is new to development arises from without. The child's characteristics have 
no constructive, positive, progressive or formative role in the history of his 
mental development ... it became clear that the relationship between instruction 
and development is presented as one of antagonism in the process of formation of 
the child's concepts ... the child's thinking is placed in opposition to the adult's 
thought. One does not arise from the other; one excludes the other ... One must 
be done away with so that the other can take its place (ibid.). 
Vygotsky's Hegelianism made him see the emergence of new forms of thought as 
inextricably connected with previous ones and his sense of the word opposition was 
different to that of Piaget. When Vygotsky wrote of 'opposition' he drew from the 
Hegelian tradition where the concept (Aufhebung) has a more complex meaning than 
distinct elements clashing as externalities. Inwood explains that Hegel uses the term 
Aufhebung in all three senses of its meaning at once-'to raise, to hold, lift up'; 'to 
annul, abolish, destroy, cancel, suspend' and 'to keep, save, preserve' (Inwood, 1995, 
p. 283). According to Inwood, 'Aufhebung is similar to determinate [negation] that 
has a positive result. What results from the sublation of something, e.g. the whole in 
which both it and its opposite survives as moments, is invariably higher than, or the 
[truth] of, the item(s) sublated' (p. 284). 
For Vygotsky, the development of scientific concepts is not one of separation, but 
of the repositioning that arises when a child uses a word for a different purpose and as 
a result, in a new sense. However as the old meaning is retained in the new, the new is 
therefore not entirely novel. Consequently what is involved is not only a merely 
different understanding of a new concept, but also crucially a new element of 
conscious awareness-an ability to act in the world in a new way. Vygotsky drew 
from Shif s research that showed that there is a higher level of conscious awareness in 
the use of scientific than in the use of everyday ones. In the child the weakness of the 
everyday concept is the child's inability to operate with it in a voluntary manner, its 
strength is its saturation with the immediate perceptual experience. For instance the 
concept brother can be used appropriately as a term of reference, but the child may 
not automatically be in a position to understand it as part of a system of other 
concepts which give it meaning. According to Vygotsky: 'The child formulates 
Archimedes' law better than he formulates his definition of what a brother is' 
(Vygotsky, 1987, p. 178). In this example Vygotsky argues that the concept brother 
and the concepts involved in Archimedes' law are learnt in different ways. The 
concept brother has already completed much of its developmental path and is 
saturated with the child's rich personal experience before the child has need to use the 
term in a scientific way (by defining it). In the case of Archimedes' law, the concept 
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has barely begun such saturation with content when the teacher starts to introduce it 
as a scientific concept. 
The distinction between Vygotsky's and Piaget's notion of different kinds of 
concepts parallels the distinction between their philosophical approaches to the 
relation of theory to practice or of rationalism to empiricism. As already noted 
according to Vygotsky, Piaget separated the different kinds of concepts more starkly 
than himself. For him they have a much greater degree of co-dependence. 
Piaget's Kantianism has quite different educational implications from the 
Hegelianism of Vygotsky. Moreover Kant's elaboration of the process of how 
knowledge is possible leaves terms separate and unrelated. Faculties of mind are 
distinguished in order to comprehend their different functions in thought. According 
to Kant these faculties are spontaneity and receptivity, concept and intuition. Each in 
its own tum explains a different mode in which knowing arises and distinguishes 
conscious knowing in the case of spontaneity from the passive reception of 
information in the case of receptivity. 
An issue at the heart of the discussion of scientific and everyday (spontaneous) 
concepts is the way in which concepts (words) are understood. The creation of 
scientific concepts i.e. their systematicity, plays a direct role in the formation and 
development of spontaneous concepts since spontaneous concepts are deployed in an 
already existing space of reasons and not formed in a void. Van der Veer notes that 
when Vygotsky speaks of everyday/spontaneous concepts he understands a child 
being inducted into usage by an adult. The adult draws on a different conceptual 
structure and positioning from that of the child. Thus while the child may have his 
own relation within a 'space of reasons' in which to use the concept and within which 
the concept has meaning for him, he is drawing on a term that has meanings and 
locations of which he is not yet aware. Consequently, he moves within a domain (a 
space of reasons) that is not yet fully his own. 
A 'historical' approach is evident throughout Vygotsky's writing. In his 
discussion of scientific concepts he criticises the view that scientific concepts may be 
learnt in a completed form, and emphasises that in such a view 'scientific concepts do 
not have their own internal history' (p. 169). He notes that the development of 
scientific concepts is not accomplished simply by teaching them to the child and by 
the child's learning of them. He argues from research that it is known that the concept 
is not just a set of associative connections but a 'complex and true act of thinking' 
(ibid.). Although educational research may take account of this point, it is difficult to 
avoid (particularly in the practice of teaching within mass state-funded schooling) the 
assumption that a concept has been taught if pupils claim that they have understood it. 
The process of development of taught concepts is not only difficult to take account of, 
in a system of monitorable results, but it is also possible that where such a system 
exists, with results sometimes being monitored even on an hourly basis, no 
development can take place at all. Pupils' apparent failures are attributed to a failure 
of ability to develop concepts rather than to the lack of opportunity for concept 
development. By the development of concepts what is meant here is not only a formal 
understanding of the concept but the ability to situate it within a system of concepts. 
The tendency to abstract the concept of thinking from the world in which it takes 
place and the forms through which it is expressed finds its origin in Descartes' 
dualism. Vygotsky continually attempts to explain mind (thinking) and world in a 
different way. He uses the Hegelian terminology of becoming in an attempt to retain 
the complexity of what is easily misunderstood as a simple relation of representation 
between thought and word: 'thought is not expressed in word, but is completed in the 
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word. One might therefore speak of the becoming (the unity of being and non-being) 
of thought and word' (Val siner & Van der Veer, 1991, p. 370). 
Vygotsky's discussion of Piaget's work indicates the difference between their 
philosophical frameworks. Piaget's concept of opposition, expressed as part of his 
argument about the development of scientific concepts, is one in which the elements 
that comprise opposition are distinct and separate as opposed to moments that are 
mutually exclusive and mutually dependent at the same time. By contrast to Piaget, 
Vygotsky posits the formation (determination) of one concept as the negation of 
another (the meaning of one concept is dependent on its relation to another). 
Vygotsky remarks on how Piaget 'sees only the break, not the connection. As a 
consequence he [Piaget] views the development of concepts as a mechanical 
combination of two separate processes which have nothing in common and move as it 
were along two completely isolated or separate channels' (Vygotsky, 1987, p. 174). 
Piaget, who only had the opportunity to read Vygotsky's work, twenty-five years 
after its publication (discovering it after Vygotsky had died), asked himself whether 
or not Vygotsky's criticism were justified in the light of his later work. He wrote; 
'The answer is both yes and no: on certain points I find myself more in agreement 
with Vygotsky than I would have been in 1934, while on other points I believe I now 
have better arguments for answering' (Piaget, 1962). In his discussion ofVygotsky's 
criticisms he, like Vygotsky, is limited by lack of access both to the author and also to 
the full work. The text Piaget read was an edited translation of a section of 
Vygotsky's work: the Hanfmann and Vakar (1962) translation of Vygotsky's 
Thinking and Speech, being the first English language publication entitled Thought 
and Language. Vygotsky only had access to the work of Piaget published before his 
death in 1934. 
Turning now to the philosophical underpinnings of Vygotsky's thinking and the 
influence of Spinoza, Vygotsky's discussion of scientific concepts and their relation 
to everyday concepts cannot be separated from deeper questions of consciousness and 
in tum from the influence of Spinoza on his thought. Consciousness is a problematic 
concept which is understood in a variety of ways reaching from on the one extreme 
simply having the capacity to pay attention to metacognition on the other. For 
Vygotsky consciousnesses was an unsettled question, and, then as now, one on which 
researchers and commentators are still working. But one thing we can say here is that 
in keeping with his rejection of Cartesian dualism, he does not see consciousness as a 
state of mind apart from the objects and activities of consciousness. For Vygotsky to 
be conscious is to be conscious of something-either an object or an activity. 
As part of the issue of consciousness Vygotsky is particularly concerned with 
'conscious awareness', which he designates a level of consciousness arising as a 
distinct aspect of consciousness as an activity rather than a level present as a simple 
natural attribute. Vygotsky links conscious awareness to scientific concepts: 
Scientific concepts have a unique relationship to the object. This relationship is 
mediated through other concepts that themselves have internal hierarchical 
systems of interrelationships. It is apparently in the domain of scientific concepts 
that conscious awareness of concepts or the generalization and mastery of 
concepts emerges for the first time. . .. Thus conscious awareness enters through 
the gate opened up by the scientific concept (Vygotsky, 1987, p. 191). 
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By changing the relation to the object, new possibilities for action arise: 'To perceive 
something in a different way means to acquire new potentials for acting with respect 
to it. At the chess board to see differently is to play differently' (p. 190). Vygotsky 
remarks that in Piaget's thought, it is not possible to find 'the thought that 
"spontaneous" is a synonym for "lack of conscious awareness" , when referring to 
concepts. He continues: 
Only within a system can the concept acquire conscious awareness and a 
voluntary nature. Conscious awareness and the presence of a system are 
synonyms when we are speaking of concepts, just as spontaneity, lack of 
conscious awareness, and the absence of system are three different words for 
designating the nature of the child's concept (p. 191). 
This concept of conscious awareness is totally different from merely receIvmg 
stimuli: it is the capacity to reflect on the process of reflection. Ilyenkov discusses the 
capacity not just to 'experience' the rays of the sun on our eyeball, but to have a 
concept of the sun projecting the rays (Ilyenkov, 1977, pp. 38-39). In other words we 
can conceive the sun apart from the effect it has on the rods and cones at the back of 
our eyes, and thus' see' the sun as more than what would simply be the experience of 
a biochemical process. This is the distinguishing feature of the human mind. 
For Vygotsky 'at one and the same time, generalization implies the conscious 
awareness and the systematisation of concepts' (Vygotsky, 1987, p. 191). Vygotsky 
argues that what Piaget failed to see was that the empirical laws and regularities, 
which he drew from his work with children, only applied within the domain of 
children's unsystematised thought. Piaget had not appreciated the possibility that the 
child's lack of systematisation was dependent on the location of the child's thinking 
activity and was not a quality of the child's thought as such. For Vygotsky what 
Piaget saw as an indication of a child's egocentricism could not be explained simply 
by reference to the intrinsic logic of the child's thought. Rather, Vygotsky argued that 
'the capacity for deduction is only possible within a definite system of relationships 
among concepts' (p. 192). Within a system, sensitivity to contradiction was possible. 
Margaret Donaldson and her colleague's replication of Piaget's experiments (to 
demonstrate the conservation ability and egocentrism of the child) achieved different 
results to Piaget because they introduced what effectually was systematic meaning 
into the test. However, this was not exactly the way in which they interpreted the 
success of their results. In Children's Minds, Donaldson explains the success of 
Martin Hughes' redesign of the 'mountain task' in terms of the fact that it 'requires 
the child to act in ways which are in line with certain very basic purposes and 
intentions (escape and pursuit) ... ' (Donaldson, 1978, p. 24). She saw it as 
introducing the motives and intentions of the characters involved in the task. However, 
it could equally be argued that Hughes' replication introduced not merely context that 
provided purposes and intentions but also the systematicity necessary to allow the 
child to make decisions according to a meaningful system of relations. If Brandom's 
point about the inferential character of any representation is taken seriously then what 
the children were offered in Hughes' task was the visibility of the 'reasons that follow 
from' and the 'reasons that are implied by', the task's events. The evidence in the 
Hughes' experiment indicated that the vast majority of children were able to 'de-
centre', unlike the egocentric children evident in Piaget's experimental results. 
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Piaget's use of the category of egocentrism is profoundly conditioned by dualism 
and as Vygotsky rejects this dualism so also he rejects Piaget's use of egocentrism. 
Vygotsky's critique of Piaget's designation of egocentrism as evidence of a child's 
incapacity to think abstractly is based on his argument that conscious awareness is 
sustained by the location of concepts in meaningful relations to one another. In the 
case of scientific concepts, meaning is developed by the location of concepts to one 
another rather than simply by direct reference to the world. 
Vygotsky used the systemic relation of concepts and the possibility of conscious 
awareness, to criticise Piaget's understanding of the relation between egocentrism and 
thought in the child: 'We found the source of the lack of conscious awareness of 
concepts not in egocentrism but in the absence of system in the child's spontaneous 
concepts' (Vygotsky, 1987, p. 193). 
The point we need to stress now is that none of these concepts as Vygotsky 
understood them, that is: Consciousness, Free will, Science, Development, can be 
understood apart from one another. Each of these is related to the other three. For 
example consciousness is stimulated by externalities when our responses are not 
passive, that is to say when we act using concepts which have a systematic relation to 
one another. For Vygotsky systematically related concepts of this type are 
characteristic of science. The possibility of acting, rather than merely behaving, arises 
through the human capacity to formulate scientific (academic) concepts or to put it 
another way to develop what Spinoza called adequate ideas. Vygotsky's focus on 
systematicity can be traced to the influences of Spinoza on his thinking. It is from 
Spinoza that Vygotsky develops his idea of conscious awareness and will. 
Spinoza's philosophy is difficult to comprehend and involves a number of 
elements unfamiliar to our modem way of thinking. These elements are: thought and 
extension as attributes of one substance; causa sui; adequate as opposed to inadequate 
ideas; and the distinction between passions and affects. Spinoza's treatment of 
theological questions led him to reject the dualist world view. He argued that as God 
(or Nature) is infinite he must be undetermined and, more than this, self-determined 
or causa sui. Through a lengthy argument, he concluded that there is only one 
substance (God or Nature) consisting of an infinite number of attributes of which 
thought and extension are part. Everything which exists has a degree of self-
determination-human beings have the highest possible degree. It is in self-
determination that human beings exhibit freedom. A free agent is not one whose 
actions are undetermined, but whose actions are self-determined and self-
determination arises only when we are not controlled by our passions. A passion is 
what Spinoza calls an affect produced by external causes rather than by our own 
power; when we are not controlled by our passions, we understand the reasons of our 
actions. To be guided by adequate rather than inadequate knowledge is to be free from 
external determination. 
For Vygotsky, following Spinoza, the basis of freedom is man's ability to separate 
himself from his passions, from the contingencies of nature, and to make for himself a 
space within which he can determine his actions. Such actions are determined, not by 
causes which are completely external but by ones which lie within his sphere of 
efficacy to which he has contributed by making significant i.e. made into reasons not 
merely causes (the causes have become normative). 
Whereas for Piaget, consciousness occurs in the child once the bankruptcy of his 
own thinking is evident, for Vygotsky, consciousness arises by the subjects' changing 
location in relation to external forms of determination. 
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Vygotsky looks to the unfolding of consciousness rather than its arbitrary positing 
in terms of the bankruptcy of egocentric thought. Vygotsky finds the genesis of 
consciousness in the development of scientific concepts. This Spinozian account of 
consciousness contributed to Vygotsky's criticisms of Piaget's failure to understand 
that the child's lack of conscious awareness was affected by his position in relation to 
what he was asked to understand, rather than to a conflict between his own childish 
concepts and those which gave him access to reality. 
Spinoza explains the relationship of will and conscious awareness as characteristic 
of concepts located in relation to one another, i.e. systemically. The more our actions 
are formed by adequate ideas (i.e. ideas where the genetic connections are understood 
explicitly) the more we are determinate of our own actions and we are said to be 
active. The more we act according to inadequate ideas (ones whose relations are 
unexpressed) we are said to be passive and as such our actions are not free: 
The physical and mental behaviour of a human being .,. may be active or passive 
to various degrees. The more it stems distinctively or creatively from its own 
conatus, the more active it is; the more it is merely acted on by external things, 
the more passive it is (Sprigge, 1995, p. 848). 
Spinoza calls the active behaviour of the mind 'adequate ideas', the passive behaviour 
'inadequate ideas'. Adequate ideas necessarily constitute more genuine knowledge: 
Spinoza regards us in bondage so far as we are under the control of external 
things (in a sense which includes especially mental processes of our own that we 
do not properly understand) and as free to the extent that we meet life with 
creative understanding of what will best serve the purposes that adequate ideas 
will determine in us (p. 848). 
Related to the Spinozist conception of freedom, gained by holding adequate ideas, is a 
totally different notion of truth from one that we commonly hold to (as the direct 
opposite of falsity and referring directly to something which is actual rather than 
actualising). Spinoza insists that: 
error is always the privation of knowledge; to say that an idea or proposition is 
false is to say that it is relatively incomplete and fragmentary, and is therefore to 
say something about its lack of logical relation with other ideas; the falsity is 
corrected as soon as the idea is placed in connexion with other ideas in a larger 
system of knowledge (Hampshire, 1992, p. 87). 
What we understand as false belief is a matter of incomplete knowledge (Hampshire, 
1992). For Spinoza adequate ideas are true by virtue of their adequacy: 
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Adequate ideas are expressive, and inadequate ideas are mute. In other words, the 
distinctive character of an adequate idea is that it tells us something about the 
structure and connections of being (or at least the attribute of thought) through a 
direct expression of its efficient and formal causes. From an ontological 
perspective, the inadequate idea tells us nothing because we cannot recognise its 
place in the productive structure of thought (Hardt, 1993, p. 90). 
Freedom for Spinoza is not a matter of choice or volition but of the mind's activity as 
opposed to its passivity. Activity for Spinoza concerned the quality of activity rather 
than its mere fact, i.e. the mind is active when its ideas are adequate and passive when 
its ideas are inadequate. For Spinoza we are said to act when we are the adequate 
cause of our actions that is when the ideas on which our actions are based on adequate 
ideas. This is a totally different sense of action from the common one which makes no 
such profound distinction. So many of the actions that we feel ourselves to be 
engaged would, if we take Spinoza's line of argument, be understood differently as 
vain less repetitions. Often such vain less repetitions perpetuate what they are 
intended to change. This, of course, is a standard psychotherapeutic position, where 
an action that is claimed by a patient to be effective, is revealed to be preserving the 
situation that the patient wishes to change. For Spinoza such activity, though it 
comprises concrete actions, is not really activity at all; or it is, to be precise, because it 
is driven by inadequate ideas-it is passivity. The mind becomes active in relation to 
these passive 'actions' once it is formed by adequate ideas and is the adequate cause 
of events. Action for Spinoza is restricted to what we are adequate cause of in the 
same way that we are active when our mind is composed of adequate ideas. 
The idea of the possibility of consciousness and the notion of objectivity (truth) 
here is expressed in a different way from that in the work of Kant, the main influence 
on Piaget. The significance of systematicity for both Spinoza and Vygotsky, is that 
the meaning of individual concepts can be understood in terms of their place within a 
system of concepts i.e. what is a reason for what is made visible. The 
Donaldson/Hughes mountain task involves a systematic set of relations between the 
'seeking policeman doll' and the 'hiding child doll'. What it is to see from another 
point of view to one's own is constituted by the very structure of the task as the 
meaning of each of its components is constituted, in part, by their relation to all the 
other components. Although Donaldson and her colleagues may have emphasised 
other aspects such as language, goal, orientation and context in their interpretation of 
the success of your children to decentre, what is crucial to the 'hide and seek' task is 
that it makes explicit normative elements (i.e. what is a reason for what) in a way that 
the three mountains task does not. 
To educate is to relocate ideas and this is different from what are termed child-
centered approaches or traditional didactic approaches. The attempt to grow a higher 
understanding exclusively from children's experiences fails as completely as the 
attempt to implant a higher understanding without regard to these experiences. But 
relocating the ideas of a child in the network of inferential relations which will give 
the child new meaning requires attending to the nature of normativity, to what is a 
reason for what and to the distinctive character of these relations in different 
knowledge domains. 
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